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A Conversation with Judge Harry T. Edwards* 
On February 18, 2004, the Honorable Harry T. Edwards, Chief 
Judge Emeritus and Circuit Judge, United States Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, delivered the 2004 Tyrrell 
Williams Lecture at Washington University School of Law in 
St. Louis. Rather than follow the usual lecture format, Judge 
Edwards participated in a “public forum.” He first answered 
questions sent to him by law students and members of the law 
school faculty in advance of his talk and then fielded inquiries 
from the audience. Most of the questions related to articles that 
Judge Edwards has written on collegiality in judicial decision 
making, judicial administration, social science models of 
decision making, interdisciplinary studies, the “harmless error” 
doctrine, legal education, and the legal profession.** Judge 
 * Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; B.S. 1962, Cornell 
University; J.D. 1965, University of Michigan. Judge Edwards was a faculty member at the 
University of Michigan Law School from 1970 to 1975 and from 1977 to 1980, and at Harvard 
Law School from 1975 to 1977, earning tenure at both schools. He was appointed to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 1980, where he served as Chief Judge from 
October 1994 until July 2001. During the past twenty-four years, he has continued to teach part-
time, serving as an Adjunct Professor of Law at Michigan, Pennsylvania, Duke, Georgetown, 
Harvard, and, most recently, New York University Law School.—Ed.  
 ** See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 
U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003); Harry T. Edwards & Linda Elliott, Beware of Numbers (and 
Unsupported Claims of Judicial Bias), 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 723 (2002); Harry T. Edwards, 
Reflections (On Law Review, Legal Education, Law Practice, and My Alma Mater), 100 MICH. 
L. REV. 1999 (2002); Harry T. Edwards, Race and the Judiciary, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
325 (2002); Harry T. Edwards, A New Vision for the Legal Profession, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
567(1997); Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal 
Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167 (1995); Harry T. Edwards, Another “Postscript” 
to “The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession”, 69 WASH. 
L. REV. 561 (1994); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and 
the Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191 (1993); Harry T. Edwards, The 
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 
(1992); Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled 
Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 837; Harry T. Edwards, A Lawyer’s Duty to Serve the 
Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1148 (1990); Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in 
Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385 (1983–84). 
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Edwards’ answers to the questions raised at the public forum 
are reprinted below. 
Dean Joel Seligman: Welcome to this year’s Tyrrell Williams 
Lecture. This is the most important named lecture at this School of 
Law. It has been a vital part of our annual experience since it was 
introduced in 1949. We have been honored throughout the decades 
by the presence of extraordinary speakers, starting with Justice Felix 
Frankfurter, who I believe was one of the very earliest speakers. We 
have had several members of the Supreme Court, several members of 
the courts of appeals, and outstanding participants in public 
discourse, such as former Harvard President Derek Bok a few years 
ago.  
Judge Edwards and I both have a connection to Michigan Law 
School. I suspect it will be of consequence to him to know that one of 
our wonderful speakers a few decades ago was the Honorable Wade 
McCree, who served for many years on the federal bench, then as 
Solicitor General, and finally as a member of the University of 
Michigan Law School faculty. Judge McCree was my colleague at 
the University of Michigan, and he was Judge Edwards’ close friend. 
Harry T. Edwards, at a consequential point in his career, was a 
Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, where he established 
a national reputation in labor law and also wrote learnedly on fields 
such as higher education. In 1980, he was appointed to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, where 
he has served ever since. Between 1994 and 2001, he was Chief 
Judge. When he began his period as Chief Judge, this terribly 
important court was one that was notably as intellectually divided as 
any court in the country. Judge Edwards deserves tremendous 
acclaim for his success in building a much greater sense of 
collegiality on this bench.  
 
 In responding to questions, I relied extensively on these published works, occasionally 
amplifying previously stated views, but mostly parroting what I have said in the past. I am frank 
to acknowledge that my views on many of the subjects covered have not changed much during 
my twenty-four years on the bench. One subject with respect to which time on the bench has 
afforded me new and richer insights is judicial collegiality, a matter that I discuss at length in 
the aforecited Pennsylvania Law Review article.—HTE 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol16/iss1/5
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Judge Edwards has lived not only as a jurist who takes the duties 
of the bench terribly seriously, but has performed an important role as 
a public intellectual. In recent years he has written extensively on a 
wide range of topics that are of enormous consequence to the bench, 
the academy, and the bar. He joins us today for a conversation in 
which he will address some of these topics. Please join me in 
welcoming Judge Harry Edwards. 
Judge Edwards: Thank you Dean Seligman for your gracious 
remarks. I have visited Washington University School of Law on a 
number of occasions to give speeches and participate in conferences, 
and I now serve as a member of the school’s National Council. My 
time here always has been rewarding, both because of the school’s 
sterling academic program and outstanding faculty, and also because 
I have a number of friends here with whom I enjoy spending time. It 
is a pleasure to be with you again. 
I want to thank Dean Peter Wiedenbeck for so ably arranging 
today’s program. I asked Dean Seligman to permit me to use a 
“public forum” format in this year‘s Tyrrell Williams Lecture, so that 
I could have a conversation with the audience. I appreciate his 
accommodation in allowing us to proceed in this way. I will first 
answer the questions submitted in advance by law students and 
faculty members and forwarded to me by Dean Wiedenbeck. I will 
then open the floor to entertain questions from the audience.  
 
Question: In a recent article you described the importance of 
collegial deliberations to decision making by the courts of appeals. 
[Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision 
Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003).] To what extent does the 
practice of assigning to appellate panels judges from another court—
especially a district court—undermine deliberative refinement?  
Judge Edwards: I will refer to “collegiality” and “collegial 
decision making” in responding to several questions, so let me first 
explain what I mean by these terms. When I speak of a collegial 
court, I do not mean that all judges are friends. And I do not mean 
that the members of the court never disagree on substantive issues. 
That would not be collegiality, but homogeneity or conformity, 
which would make for a decidedly unhealthy judiciary. Instead, what 
I mean is that judges have a common interest, as members of the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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judiciary, in getting the law right, and that, as a result, we are willing 
to listen, persuade, and be persuaded, all in an atmosphere of civility 
and respect. Collegiality is a process that helps to create the 
conditions for principled agreement, by allowing all points of view to 
be aired and considered. 
With this in mind, let me turn to the question about visiting 
judges. A rule that has been important to the rise in collegiality on the 
D.C. Circuit is an agreement among the judges that, absent a grave 
emergency, the court will not use visiting judges to decide cases on 
our docket. This rule is not meant to suggest any disrespect for our 
judicial colleagues from other courts. Rather, our judges believe that 
working without visiting judges allows us to interact with fewer 
distractions. The D.C. Circuit docket largely consists of very dense 
administrative law cases in appeals that often include huge records 
and numerous parties with their numerous briefs. It is not an inviting 
caseload for judges who are not used to it. We have also found that it 
is much easier to maintain the quality of our own work if we interact 
only with each other. We are very open and forthright in our critiques 
of one another, confident in the understanding that all that we say is 
“in house” and “among family.” Our thinking and writing thus 
benefit from a robust and healthy back-and-forth that makes for better 
individual opinions and a more coherent body of law generally. In 
short, to ensure expeditious issuance of our decisions, balanced work 
assignments among our judges, and coherence in the law of the 
circuit, we decided that only the judges of the court should do the 
work of our court. The rule allows us to maintain tight control over 
the law of the circuit. We can monitor and react to one another very 
closely. I think the rule has had a positive effect on the cohesiveness 
of our judges as a group and coherence of the law of our circuit. I 
have always believed that the adoption of this rule in the early-1990s 
represented a crucial turning point for the D.C. Circuit at a time when 
collegiality was at a low point. 
District Court judges from our circuit faced a unique burden when 
they served as visiting judges on the Court of Appeals. Although our 
District Court colleagues are generally quite familiar with the law of 
the circuit, they necessarily experienced the tension of being asked to 
sit in judgment of their colleagues. I am not aware of any visiting 
District Court judge who ultimately let this effect his or her decision 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol16/iss1/5
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making; however, I have heard some District Court judges say that 
sitting in judgment of other trial judges generates a certain self-
consciousness that contributes nothing good to the decision-making 
process. 
 
Question: Can a court be too large to maintain collegiality?  
Judge Edwards: Yes, I think so. Appellate judging is a 
collaborative enterprise. If a court is too large, interactions between 
colleagues become diffuse. The number of times that one has 
occasion to work with any particular colleague decreases, and it 
consequently becomes harder to “read” and understand any single 
colleague’s concerns and interests. A couple of things can then 
happen. The discussion among judges, which is the essence of 
appellate decision making, can lose the robustness that comes with 
the candor of colleagues who know each other well and trust each 
other. And consensus on the nuance of an issue becomes less likely. 
Collaboration is limited to the large outline of an answer, while 
responsibility for the details falls more heavily on the individual 
drafting an opinion. The law of a circuit may consequently begin to 
reflect many disparate voices, rather than one coherent view.  
 
Question: Is the Ninth Circuit too large?  
Judge Edwards: Many judges on the Ninth Circuit are very 
happy with their court in its present form. The court is too large for 
my tastes, however. My court consists of eleven judges, all of whom 
have chambers in one courthouse in Washington, D.C. I view this to 
be an ideal situation. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit, at last count, 
consisted of twenty-six active judges and twenty senior judges—
nearly fifty judges on the court of appeals, with the judges sitting in 
widely dispersed locations. This is not an arrangement that I would 
prefer. Many judges are convinced that collegiality enables better 
decisions and that smaller courts tend to be more collegial. I agree. In 
addition, as Judge Richard Posner has pointed out, given the size of 
the Ninth Circuit, the establishment of a viable process for rehearing 
cases en banc is very difficult. Because it is not feasible for the court 
to rehear cases en banc with all active judges sitting, the en banc 
court is limited to the chief judge plus a randomly chosen subset of 
the active members of the court. Under this procedure, a significant 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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number of judges, including, possibly, all of the panel members 
involved in the initial decision, do not participate in each en banc 
rehearing. This can skew the decision-making process, as the 
outcome of a case will depend, in part, on the “lottery” pursuant to 
which the en banc panel is chosen.  
 
Question: How does a large law faculty, whose members are not 
forced to work with each other frequently and on an individual basis, 
maintain collegiality? 
Judge Edwards: It is difficult due to the inherent nature of 
academia. Academics, and legal scholars in particular, are generally 
rewarded for individual achievement, not collaborative effort. In fact, 
there is little that is central to success in legal academy that requires 
collaboration. Individual faculty members may confer over matters of 
common interest, participate in faculty colloquia, and critique the 
work of one another. But they need not. An individual can be a 
brilliant scholar and a brilliant teacher without ever collaborating 
with his or her colleagues. It is only in clinical and administrative 
settings that collaboration is truly important in law school missions. 
And an individual law professor can be quite successful in the 
academy without ever engaging in either of those two endeavors. 
In contrast, when it is done properly, appellate judging is a very 
different enterprise. When cases are heard and decided by 
multi-member panels, collaboration is essential. In an uncollegial 
environment, divergent views among members of a court often end 
up as dissenting opinions. Why? Because judges tend to follow a 
“party line” and adopt unalterable positions on the issues before 
them. This is especially true in the hard and very hard cases that 
involve highly controversial issues. Judges who initially hold 
different views tend not to think hard about the quality of the 
arguments made by those with whom they disagree, so no serious 
attempt is made to find common ground. Judicial divisions are sharp 
and firm. And sharp divisions on hard and very hard issues give rise 
to “ideological camps” among judges, which in turn beget divisions 
in cases that are not very difficult. It is not a good situation.  
I want to make it clear that, when I speak of collegial decision 
making, I am not endorsing the suppression of divergent views 
among members of a court. Quite the contrary. In a collegial 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol16/iss1/5
p 61 Edwards book pages.doc  9/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004]  A Conversation with Judge Harry T. Edwards 67 
 
 
environment, divergent views are more likely to gain a full airing in 
the deliberative process—judges go back and forth in their 
deliberations over disputed and difficult issues until agreement is 
reached. This is not a matter of one judge “compromising” his or her 
views to a prevailing majority. Rather, until a final judgment is 
reached, judges participate as equals in the deliberative process—
each judicial voice carries weight, because each judge is willing to 
hear and respond to differing positions. The mutual aim of the judges 
is to apply the law and find the right answer. 
Judicial colleagues who are able to advance the common 
enterprise are cherished. The public measure of a judge is based 
almost entirely on the judge’s opinions. What the public does not 
always understand is that just as important to the decision making 
process is what the judge brings to the table in terms of his or her 
ability to collaborate: is the judge someone who colleagues can call 
on to test a theory? Does the judge ask probing questions at oral 
argument? Is he or she someone who contributes seriously to the 
conference following oral argument? Is the judge generous with his 
or her expertise and insights? Does the judge raise questions when he 
or she does not understand the contradictory view of a colleague? 
Does the judge possess a scholarly breadth that enhances his or her 
contributions to the process? In other words, collaborative decision 
making is the heart of our work, so judges have an incentive to 
promote collegiality. Law faculty members do not have the same 
incentive. 
To the extent that collegiality is important to the work of law 
faculties, it can be promoted by strong leadership. In this way, 
judicial and academic institutions are very similar. There are social 
science studies indicating that people tend to follow the lead of those 
in charge. I think this is especially true if the suggestions of the 
leadership advance the enterprise. There is little doubt in my mind 
that a chief judge who values collegiality and who takes steps to 
nurture it is more likely to find him or herself with a more collegial 
court. I am sure that the same is true in a law school. In other words, 
it matters that this law school has a strong and visionary dean in Joel 
Seligman. I am sure that the positive steps that he has taken to make 
the law school great have drawn the faculty together in pursuit of 
goals that serve the best interests of the law school, even in instances 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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when all members of the faculty do not agree on a particular goal or 
on the steps to be taken to achieve it. This is how strong leadership 
promotes collegiality. 
 
Question: You have expressed skepticism of the value of some 
forms of interdisciplinary legal studies, observing that where “the 
conversations [we]re devoid of prescriptions,” they are “the stuff of 
graduate schools, not law schools.” [Harry T. Edwards, Reflections 
(On Law Review, Legal Education, Law Practice, And My Alma 
Mater), 100 MICH. L. REV. 1999, 2001 (2002).] In your view, legal 
scholars and educators, unlike experts in other disciplines, “must be 
both descriptive and normative to pursue law and justice. We have an 
obligation not just to clarify legal issues but to help solve them and 
produce the best and most just answers to concrete problems.” [Id. at 
2003.] Doesn’t the mixing of positive and normative analysis invite 
slanted recommendations driven by the author’s hidden policy 
preferences? 
Judge Edwards: All recommendations come with a “slant,” so I 
do not view this as a problem. It is not a bad thing for legal scholars 
to offer concrete solutions to difficult problems in society, so long as 
their positive and normative analyses are supported by solid research, 
coherent reasoning, defensible data, and clear writing. 
 
Question: In another context you have criticized inflammatory 
conclusions drawn from oversimplified empiricism. [Harry T. 
Edwards & Linda Elliott, Beware of Numbers (And Unsupported 
Claims of Judicial Bias), 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 723 (2002).] How is a 
legislature or a court to guard against biased prescriptive analysis? 
Judge Edwards: It is easy to guard against “biased prescriptive 
analysis” if a scholar reveals his or her reasoning and data. In the 
article to which you refer, my colleague, Linda Elliott, and I 
challenged a claim by legal scholars that federal appellate judges 
harbor an unprincipled bias against plaintiff/appellants. [See Kevin 
M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the 
Federal Appellate Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128 (2000); Kevin M. 
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: 
Defendants’ Advantage, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 125 (2001).] We 
argued that the “thesis [was] specious, because it [was] founded on 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol16/iss1/5
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flawed reasoning and deficient empirical research.” It was easy for us 
to assess the thesis, because the scholars’ data was fully exposed. It is 
noteworthy that, in a subsequent article, one of the scholars 
essentially retracted the original thesis. After “re-running the 
analysis” with refined data, the scholar found no statistically 
significant results to support the claim “that appellate courts 
reviewing tried cases tend to be more favorable to defendants than to 
plaintiffs.” [See Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The 
Reliability of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Database: 
An Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1455, 1477 
n.87 (2003).] 
 
Question: In your Collegiality article, you take issue with both the 
attitudinal and the strategic models of judicial decision making. 
[Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision 
Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1652–62 (2003).] Most support for 
those models is found in studies of U.S. Supreme Court decisions. 
Intermediate courts of appeals are differently situated and are 
arguably the only truly constrained judicial decision maker. Trial 
courts are largely unconstrained in their findings of fact, and courts of 
last resort have broad discretion to declare the law. Intermediate 
appellate courts, in contrast, are hemmed in by both the record from 
below (facts) and precedent from above (law). You have estimated 
that in only five to fifteen percent of the cases that come before you 
are the parties’ arguments equally strong. Does this explain why 
social science models seem unsuited to the courts of appeals, and 
correspondingly, why collegiality seems to have greater force? 
Judge Edwards: I think it is true that intermediate, appellate 
courts are more naturally constrained in their decision-making than 
are trial courts or the Supreme Court. Trial judges sit alone, so they 
normally do not experience the sort of collegial deliberations that are 
at the core of appellate judging. The Supreme Court, however, is a 
collegial body, and commentators have noted the group-decisional 
aspects of the Court’s work. However, the Supreme Court’s docket 
consists of many more “very hard” cases than do those of the lower 
appellate courts. The majority of the cases in the circuit courts admit 
of a right or a best answer and do not require the exercise of 
discretion. Lower appellate courts are thus constrained far more than 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the Supreme Court. As a result, in the eyes of the public, the media, 
judges, and the legal profession, the Supreme Court is seen as more 
of a “political” institution than are the lower appellate courts. The 
Supreme Court also faces the burden of having to sit en banc in every 
case. This may mean that collegiality on the Court operates very 
differently from the collegial process at work in the lower appellate 
courts, where judges only rarely sit en banc.  
 
Question: In your study of the harmless error doctrine, you 
distinguish the “guilt-based approach” from the “effect-on-the-verdict 
approach” and trace the dramatic expansion of the harmless error 
doctrine in recent decades. [Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, But 
Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167 (1995).] You observe that the two approaches 
are too easily conflated, because, “[a]t bottom, it is impossible for an 
appellate judge to consider whether an error has influenced a jury 
without thinking about the weight of the evidence against the 
defendant; and once an appellate judge lapses into this mindset, it is 
difficult to avoid guilt-based decisionmaking.” [Id. at 1173.] Isn’t the 
problem that both the guilt-based approach and the effect-on-the-
verdict approach adopt an individualized ex-post perspective, 
attentive only to the facts and the defendant before the court, and 
ignore the ex-ante perspective, which would emphasize the 
consequences of the ruling on other actors (police, prosecutors, etc.) 
in future cases, and thereby vindicate the court’s role as the guardian 
of the integrity of the judicial process? The ex-ante perspective would 
not necessitate a bright-line rule that every constitutional error is 
harmful [see id. at 1207], because some constitutional protections are 
more important than others, and categorical distinctions could be 
developed by the accumulation of precedent (akin to the case law 
elaboration of procedural due process safeguards). 
Judge Edwards: It is true that both the guilt-based and 
effect-on-the-verdict approaches rely on ex post perspectives. Both 
approaches require judges to guess about the consequences of errors 
after the fact. The guilt-based approach focuses on the weight of the 
evidence against the defendant to determine whether the error-free 
portion of the record is sufficient to uphold a verdict against the 
defendant. I reject this approach, because it allows judges to conflate 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol16/iss1/5
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the harmlessness inquiry with our own assessment of a defendant’s 
guilt. This approach is dangerously seductive, for our natural 
inclination is to view an error as harmless whenever a defendant’s 
conviction appears well justified by the record evidence.  
The effect-on-the-verdict approach is quite different. Under this 
approach, appellate judges examine the record to determine whether 
the error might have influenced the jury, and hence contaminated the 
verdict; if that is the case, the appellate court has a duty to find that 
the appellant did not get the jury trial to which he or she was entitled. 
I recognize, however, that the effect-on-the-verdict approach is not 
always easy to apply. It is simple to state that the harmless-error 
analysis looks to the effect of the error on the verdict, rather than to 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. It is yet 
another, more difficult thing for appellate judges to adhere to that 
analytical framework when confronted with the concrete facts of a 
particular case in which the defendant’s guilt seems well established. 
It requires discipline, but that is our responsibility. 
Neither approach aims to make the police and prosecutors fully 
accountable for all of their misdeeds. But this is not necessarily a bad 
thing. Our modern judicial system is based on the assumption that we 
ignore some errors because they do not prejudice either the defendant 
or the system. If every error was “reversible error,” an extraordinary 
percentage of trial judgments would be reversed. In my view, it 
would demean the system to credit trivial errors.  
I do not think the “case law elaboration of procedural due process 
safeguards” suggests a different approach. Under established case 
law, courts are forced to weigh the record in each case to determine 
the applicable due process safeguards. [Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”); see also 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).] There are few 
categorical distinctions. 
My concern with the harmless error doctrine, as applied, is that 
some judges may be too ready to find harmless error to avoid the 
burden of re-trial. This is a mistake. And we sometimes forget that 
the burden is on the government to prove that an error is harmless. 
This, too, perverts the judicial system. 
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Question: In The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education 
and the Legal Profession: A Postscript [91 MICH. L. REV. 2191 
(1993)], you describe the overall support and encouragement you 
received from many law school deans and faculty members for your 
proposals for changing legal scholarship and the law school 
curriculum. Now that over ten years have passed since your article’s 
publication, what feedback have you received from law deans and 
faculty about the utility of your proposals and the progress made 
toward your ideals? 
Judge Edwards: The “Growing Disjunction” article has been the 
subject of extensive commentary and debate over the past decade. 
And my proposals, which were described therein, have continued to 
find support among faculty and deans. Nevertheless, though there has 
been some progress in legal education in recent years, I believe that 
much remains to be done.  
At a conference in 2000, Robert Clark, who was then Dean of 
Harvard Law School, aptly observed that, 
[i]n the last 35 years, the most important development [that we 
have seen] has been the sheer growth and differentiation of 
legal education which reflects a similar pattern of development 
in the legal profession. . . . [T]he claim of the legal system on 
the economy and polity, both absolutely and in percentage 
terms, has gone up. The same can be said of the legal 
profession. It is much bigger . . . . And many more areas of 
life, economic and social, are covered by law.  
The academy has responded to this—not necessarily 
consciously, quickly, or certainly not optimally—but it has 
responded. . . . [T]here are many more law schools, many more 
law students, many more professors, and a vastly bigger 
curriculum that covers many more subjects. As a result of this 
growth, there has been differentiation . . . Now we have 
scholars who are high theorists, who are almost purely 
historians of law, and law and economics people. We also have 
many more interdisciplinary specialists . . . [clinical law 
teachers, and experts in international law].  
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[T]his parallels developments in legal practice. It’s a massive 
phenomenon, and it’s quite natural—not necessarily good 
though.  
[Robert C. Clark, Remarks at the 2000 Judicial Conference, United 
States Courts for the District of Columbia Circuit (Jun. 15, 2000), at 
2–3, available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/jconf/ 
legal_edu_all.pdf.] In my view, Dean Clark is quite right when he 
says that many of the developments in legal education have not been 
pursued “consciously, quickly, or optimally,” and that many of these 
developments have not necessarily been good. 
A greater effort has been made by the law schools to recruit PhDs 
who have a real interest in the law. This is good. Better clinical 
programs have developed in many more law schools, and more law 
schools now seriously credit the work of clinical faculty members. 
And this is also good. Generally, there are also many more courses 
now being taught in law school. In my view, this is not unqualifiedly 
good, as the expanded curriculum has led to some incoherence in 
legal education. In many law schools, at least two-thirds of student 
course-work is not guided by content—students study what they want 
in the second and third years of law school, often with no good 
pedagogical reasons for their course selections.  
I also believe that there are still too many legal scholars who tend 
to discuss material from non-law disciplines without situating it in a 
meaningful legal context. I think that some of this is attributable to a 
misguided sense of intellectual superiority. I continue to hear some 
law professors who do work in non-law areas speak disdainfully of 
applying their work in legal contexts. Legal doctrine is dismissed as 
trite. And abstractions are favored over prescriptions. It makes little 
sense to me. 
The other significant problem that I have noted in recent years is 
the prevalence of hiring policies heavily favoring candidates who 
have published major articles prior to beginning the application 
process. This necessarily favors persons who have earned PhDs and 
excludes bright young lawyers with significant practice experience. 
This exacerbates the distressing disconnection between legal 
education and legal practice.  
I do not understand why law schools would consciously adopt 
hiring policies that effectively preclude brilliant practitioners from 
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entering the teaching market. Law schools are professional schools, 
not graduate schools. We grant JDs, not PhDs. Upon graduation, our 
students are qualified to seek licenses not available to persons who do 
not have a legal education. Thus, the public has a right to assume that 
holders of these licenses have attained a certain level of professional 
competence, share a commitment to a defined set of ethical norms, 
and accept the responsibility to interpret and practice the law in 
public-regarding ways. At its simplest level, law students must learn 
what the law is and how lawyers employ or enforce the law on behalf 
of clients.  
This is not to denegrate the importance of theory in legal 
education. Good legal scholarship and teaching, as I envision it, is not 
wholly doctrinal. Rather, in my view, a good law teacher employs 
theory to criticize doctrine, to resolve problems that doctrine leaves 
open, and to propose changes in law or in systems of justice. Ideally, 
then, a legal scholar always integrates theory with doctrine.  
Law schools are not “trade schools,” so there can be no dispute 
that, in addition to theory, quality legal education also must include 
an understanding of relevant interdisciplinary considerations, 
analyses of social impacts, and proposals for reform. At bottom, 
however, a “professional education” must address certain skills with 
respect to which a trained “professional” should rightly be viewed as 
an authority. We are professionals because we can practice within 
defined legal systems, performing jobs that others in society are 
neither skilled nor certified to perform. There is certainly no excess 
of legal scholars who understand the nuances of legal practice, so it 
seems to me that law school hiring practices should allow for the 
hiring of candidates with practice experience, along with PhDs and 
other candidates who have spent no meaningful time working in the 
legal profession. 
 
Question: Many students come to law school intending to practice 
public service law, but end up taking jobs in law firms. Putting aside 
financial pressures, what role, if any, does a law faculty have in this 
reversal, and what can be done to change it? 
Judge Edwards: I sometimes sense an attitude of indifference 
among some legal scholars with respect to problems facing the legal 
profession. These academics seem to believe that theoretical 
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contemplation should not be subordinated to the demands of legal 
practice. But legal education inevitably shapes the profession, and if 
academicians abdicate their duty to communicate the profession’s 
traditional commitment to the public good, they deliver students, by 
default, to the forces supporting an unbridled corporatizing of the 
profession.  
A few years ago, Joseph A. Califano, Jr. gave a wonderful 
keynote address at the District of Columbia Bar’s mid-year 
conference. His words capture my thoughts regarding the challenges 
that legal academics face in seeking to inspire law students to serve 
the public good upon graduation: 
We lawyers must get our house in order. We must do so not 
simply out of our own self interest and desire for status and 
prestige in society. We must do so because in a turbulent 
democracy, lawyers are key to nourishing freedom and 
protecting it when it is threatened. Lawyers bear responsibility 
to craft ways for individuals to perceive and receive justice in a 
society that threatens to swallow citizens in ever larger and 
more impersonal government, corporate and union 
bureaucracies. Lawyers are key to prosecuting criminals and 
protecting law abiding citizens. 
Without lawyers, equal protection is a phrase carved on a 
federal building. Without lawyers, legal segregation would still 
be a way of life in the nation’s capital. Without lawyers, 
corrupt government will become the customary way of doing 
the public’s business. Without lawyers, tenants[’] rights would 
be subject to the whimsy of landlords, the First Amendment 
would be more rhetoric than reality, battered spouses and 
abused children would have little recourse. It is lawyers who 
must devise processes to assure that our scientific genius 
supports individual freedom and does not suppress it; and 
lawyers who must shape ways to cushion the harsh blows of 
free market forces on the individual. 
Lawyers should be the most reliable life preservers for a 
people tossed in a sea of powerful government and private 
institutions, slammed by tidal waves of scientific discovery 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 61 Edwards book pages.doc  9/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 16:61 
 
 
and technological revolution. That’s why it’s worth a 
herculean effort to rebuild the credibility, respect and integrity 
of the profession.  
[Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Address at the District of Columbia Bar’s 
Annual 1997 Mid-Year Conference (Feb. 26, 1997).] The only way 
that legal academics can impart this message, however, is if they 
understand and respect the work of legal practitioners. 
There are also concrete things that law schools can do to 
encourage students to consider public service work, either in public 
interest or government jobs, or in addition to their work with 
traditional law firms. First, law schools can ensure that students are 
exposed to an integrated model of legal education, one that fully 
embraces theoretical and doctrinal scholarship, critical legal studies, 
clinical education, strong involvement with members of the judiciary 
and practicing bar, international issues, and public-interest ventures. 
Faculty hiring should focus on diversity of perspectives, with no 
ideological or academic group having favored status. Theorists, 
critical legal scholars, and clinicians—all with very different 
interests—should flourish in an environment of mutual respect, 
sharing equal status and prominence on the faculty. Along with a full 
and integrated curriculum, students should be openly encouraged to 
consider and pursue diverse professional interests. A strong clinical 
program emphasizes the need and value of good practitioners, and 
generous scholarship awards or loan forgiveness programs for 
students committed to public interest work makes it possible for 
smart people to avoid debt and pursue legal careers that will serve the 
disadvantaged.  
 
Question: In your concurring opinion in United States v. 
Harrington [947 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1991)], you expressed a concern 
that the federal Sentencing Guidelines unduly restrict the discretion 
of trial judges in sentencing. How should district court judges 
respond to this problem? 
Judge Edwards: There are many federal judges who have 
problems with the Sentencing Guidelines, especially when coupled 
with mandatory minimum sentences. [See JOSÉ A. CABRANES & 
KATE STITH, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS (1998).] Nonetheless, district court judges, and 
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court of appeals judges as well, are obliged to follow the law. Unless 
the Supreme Court holds that the Guidelines are legally infirm or 
Congress passes legislation to change the law, we must adhere to the 
law as it is currently written. 
 
Question: What was the reaction of your colleagues to your 
concurring opinion in Bartlett v. Bowen [824 F.2d 1240, 1242–44 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J., concurring)], in which the D.C. 
Circuit, having decided to grant an en banc rehearing, reconsidered 
its decision and denied rehearing? 
Judge Edwards: I am not sure that I recall the “reaction” of my 
colleagues. In my concurring opinion, I wrote that the “clearly 
wrong” or “highly dubious” position urged by the dissent to 
determine when to rehear a case en banc was “a self-serving and 
result-oriented criterion” that was doing substantial violence to the 
collegiality that is indispensable to judicial decision making. 
Collegiality cannot exist if every dissenting judge feels obliged to 
lobby his or her colleagues to rehear the case en banc in order to 
vindicate that judge’s position. Politicking will replace the thoughtful 
dialogue that characterizes a court where every judge respects the 
integrity of his or her colleagues. Furthermore, such politicking 
would impugn the integrity of panel judges, who are both intelligent 
enough to know the law and conscientious enough to abide by their 
oath to uphold it. 
My concurring statement in Bartlett v. Bowen is the only time that 
I have actually discussed collegiality in an opinion, which is ironic in 
light of the fact that I did so at a time when collegiality, as I know it 
today, did not exist on the D.C. Circuit. That opinion is a testament to 
my desire for a collegial court at a moment when the D.C. Circuit 
was very much in the grip of ideological division. In an uncollegial 
environment at its worst, decisions to rehear cases en banc can result 
in disastrous, ideologically driven, and result-oriented judicial 
decision making. A high rate of en banc rehearings can be a symptom 
of an absence of collegiality. And, as my colleague Chief Judge 
Ginsburg has noted, it can also pose a threat to collegiality. It can 
both reflect and feed a court’s lack of confidence in the work of 
panels. However, the complete absence of en banc review may also 
be detrimental to collegiality, because panels may become too 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 61 Edwards book pages.doc  9/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 16:61 
 
 
independent of the rest of the court. On a collegial court, the court 
trusts panels to do their work, and the possibility of en banc 
rehearings constrains panels to be responsible to the full court. [See 
Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981–
1990, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1008 (1991); Douglas H. Ginsburg & 
Brian M. Boynton, The Court En Banc: 1991–2002, 70 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 259, 260 (2002).] 
 
Question: How does a troubled court become a more collegial 
one?  
Judge Edwards: This is a good question. Unfortunately, there is 
no easy answer. In my Pennsylvania Law Review article, I discuss a 
number of factors that affect collegiality. I conclude with the 
following note: 
The D.C. Circuit has changed dramatically in the years that I 
have been on the bench. In that time, it has gone from an 
ideologically divided court to a collegial one in which the 
personal politics of the judges do not play a significant role in 
decision making. In reflecting on this over the years, I have 
come to understand that there are a number of factors that may 
affect appellate decision making, some that should and some 
that should not. Among these factors are the requirements of 
positive law, precedent, how a case is argued by the litigants, 
the effects of the confirmation process, the ideological views 
of the judges, leadership, diversity on the bench, whether a 
court has a core group of smart, well-seasoned judges, whether 
the judges have worked together for a good period of time, and 
internal court rules. My contention is that decision making is 
substantially enhanced if these factors are “filtered” by 
collegiality. There are cross-fertilizing effects between 
collegiality and certain of these factors (such as internal court 
rules, leadership, and diversity), so that the factors both 
promote collegiality and enhance decision making when they 
are filtered by collegiality. In the end, collegiality mitigates 
judges’ ideological preferences and enables us to find common 
ground and reach better decisions. In other words, the more 
collegial the court, the more likely it is that the cases that come 
before it will be determined on their legal merits. 
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[Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision 
Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1652–62 (2003).] 
Question: Do you think that, because the Senate confirmation 
process is so politicized, state court judges and district court judges, 
looking towards trying to get a promotion to a higher court, may 
change the way they do their job? 
Judge Edwards: I have no reason to believe that any of my 
judicial colleagues would tailor their decisions to garner political 
favor in future confirmation proceedings. That would be dishonest 
and totally at odds with our oath of office. It may happen at times, but 
I have never seen it. 
The effect of public scrutiny in the confirmation process cannot be 
ignored, however. The ideologically driven image of courts 
resurfaces whenever judicial nominees’ political views are 
scrutinized in the public eye. If an appointee joins the court feeling 
committed to the political party that ensured the appointment, the 
judge’s instinct could be to vote in a block with other perceived 
conservatives or liberals. Even worse, a judge who has been put 
through an ideologically driven confirmation ordeal could take the 
bench feeling animosity toward the party that attempted to torpedo 
the appointment on ideological grounds. In short, by exaggerating the 
stakes in the trial and appellate nomination battles, interest groups on 
both sides may be encouraging the appointment of judges who will 
fulfill their worst fears. Focusing on the ideology of the nominee can 
be detrimental to collegiality if it promotes a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
Even though most judges are able to resist the temptation to 
conform to the false perception created by a political confirmation 
process, the continued assessment of judicial performance in political 
terms could cause the public to believe that the judicial function is 
nothing more than a political enterprise. No matter how good the 
intentions of its servants, the judiciary will be sharply devalued and 
become incompetent to fulfill its role as mediator in a society with 
lofty but sometimes conflicting ambitions. This would be a horror to 
behold.  
Dean Seligman: Judge Edwards, thank you so much. 
Judge Edwards: Thank you, Dean. Once again, it has been an 
honor for me to visit with you, members of the faculty, esteemed 
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alumni and benefactors, and law students at Washington University 
School of Law. I have appreciated your kind hospitality during my 
visit.  
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